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THE CORPORATE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS*
INTRODUCTION

Since the reign of the Tudors, English law has recognized the attorneyclient privilege on the theory that an attorney owes a duty of loyalty to his
client.' Although numerous justifications for the privilege have been advanced,' it is widely assumed that the privilege exists today to encourage
free consultation and exchange of information between attorney and
client. 3 Thus, the privilege bars disclosure of confidential communications
* This article is a student work prepared by Allen A. Hans, a member of the ST. JOHN'S LAW
REVIEW and the St. Thomas More Institute for Legal Research.
' The early English concept of privilege, grounded on the theory that it was an attorney's duty
to preserve the confidences of his client, was considered a "point of honor" not to be breached
by the client's representative. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290, at 543 (McNaughton rev. ed.
1961) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE]. Indeed, it is possible that the origins of the attorneyclient privilege date back to Roman times, where, as a matter of fidelity between master and
servant, "[a]dvocates . . . could not be called as witnesses against their clients while the
case was in progress." Radin, The Privilegeof ConfidentialCommunicationsBetween Lawyer
and Client, 16 CALIF. L. REV. 487, 488 (1928). The nexus between the Roman concept of loyalty
and the Elizabethan view of integrity is a tenuous one at best; nevertheless, both principles
evidence an early desire to ensure confidence between a client and his legal representative.
2 For an indepth discussion of the history and purpose of the privilege, see Gardner, A Reevaluation of the Attorney-Client Privilege (pts. 1 & 2), 8 VILL. L. REv. 279, 447 (1963). In
Annesley v. Earl of Angelesa, 17 How. St. Tr. 1139 (1743), the proposition is asserted that a
vital privilege is a necessary concomitant to the functioning of a modern industrial economy.
In so concluding, the court opined: "[AIll people and all courts have looked upon that
confidence between the party and attorney to be so great, that it would be destructive to all
business, if attornies were to disclose the business of their clients ....
" Id. at 1226.
1 In his discussion of the modern policy underlying the attorney-client privilege, Dean
Wigmore states: "In order to promote freedom of consultation of legal advisers by clients, the
apprehension of compelled disclosure by the legal advisers must be removed; hence the law
must prohibit such disclosure except on the client's consent." 8 WIGMORE, supra note 1, §
2291, at 545. See also Chirac v. Reinicker, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 280, 294 (1826); Simon, The
Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 953, 954 (1956)
[hereinafter cited as Simon].
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between attorney and client on the principle that the possibility of divulgence of such communications would inhibit the "unrestricted and unbounded confidence" 4 which is essential for the preservation of the client's
legal rights.5 Although the theory on which the privilege operates has been
widely recognized and accepted, federal courts have imposed a number of
restrictions upon its availability. The chief reason for these restrictions has
been the fear that the privilege may run afoul of the policy of liberal
pretrial discovery." Moreover, its application has been subject to uncerUnited States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1961).
Judge Kaufman, now Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, has noted
that although certain confidential attorney-client communications may have independent
evidentiary value, "their revelation will impair the social good derived from the proper performance of the functions of lawyers for their clients." Comercio E Indus. Continental, S.A.
v. Dresser Indus., 19 F.R.D. 513, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
The conditions necessary for the privilege to attach have been well defined:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in
his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in
confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from
disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.
8 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2292, at 554 (footnote omitted). For an alternative and more
detailed statement of the availability of the privilege, see United States v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp., 89 F.Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950) (Wyzanski, J.).
In spite of the broad scope of the privilege there have been limitations placed upon its
applicability. See, e.g., Giordani v. Hoffman, 278 F. Supp. 886 (E.D. Pa. 1968), wherein the
court, applying Pennsylvania law, qualified the privilege by holding that it embraces only
those communications acquired by the attorney by virtue of his professional relationship with
the client, "not . . . those facts with which counsel may become acquainted collaterally
.....
" Id. at 889. When the conditions precedent necessary for the privilege to attach have
been met, the attorney is duty bound to assert the privilege in his client's behalf. See, e.g.,
Tillotson v. Boughner, 350 F.2d 663, 665 (7th Cir. 1965); Schwimmer v. United States, 232
F.2d 855, 863 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956); cf. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY No. 4, EC 4-4. The ethical considerations concerning an attorney betraying
his client's confidences are stronger, both in scope and duration, than is the evidentiary
attorney-client privilege. See, e.g., Doe v. A. Corp., 330 F. Supp. 1352 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd
sub nom. Hall v. A. Corp., 453 F.2d 1375 (2d Cir. 1972) (per curiam). Before the action was
commenced, plaintiff Doe was an attorney associated with a law firm representing defendant
corporations. Upon termination of his relationship with the firm, Doe purchased one share of
stock of the A. Corporation and brought a derivative action, charging the individual defendants, officers, and directors of the defendant corporations, with fraud, breach of fiduciary
duty, and violations of the federal securities laws. Doe had acquired the information upon
which he based his complaint in the course of the prior attorney-client relationship. Relying
upon Canon 4, the court held that "where any substantial relationship" can be shown between counsel's former representation and subsequent litigation in which the attorney is
involved, his participation in the latter will be prohibited. 330 F. Supp. at 1355, quoting T.C.
Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp. 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). See generally
Note, Disqualificationof Attorneys for Representing Interests Adverse to Former Clients, 64
YALE L.J. 917 (1955).
6 The Supreme Court has noted that discovery is designed to "make a trial less of a game of
blindman's buff [sic] and more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to
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tainty due to a lack of clear statutory guidelines.'
Notwithstanding one contrary district court opinion,8 it is well settled
that the corporate client enjoys the benefits of the attorney-client privilege.9 Nevertheless, courts have encountered problems when called upon
the fullest practicable extent." United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682
(1958). Accordingly, consistent with their function, viz., to frame issues, eliminate surprise,
and expose fraudulent and groundless claims, the discovery rules, FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37, are
liberally construed in favor of the party seeking pretrial information. 8 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2001, at 17 (1970). The attorney-client privilege,
however, impedes the search for truth by shielding information relevant to the controversy
at hand. Dean Wigmore has noted that the scope of the privilege should be construed restrictively since its "benefits are indirect and speculative; its obstruction is plain and concrete."
8 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2291, at 554. But see Hawkins, Discovery and Rule 34: What's
So Wrong About Surprise?, 39 A.B.A.J. 1075 (1953). See also Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Miller,
402 F.2d 134, 143 (8th Cir. 1968).
' Unlike most state courts, which can define the boundaries of the privilege by resort to
statutory language, see, e.g., N.Y. Clv. PRAC. LAW & RULES § 4503 (McKinney 1963), federal
courts must look exclusively to the common law to derive the scope of the privilege. Unfortunately, federal courts are often forced to reconcile a mass of conflicting judicial precedents.
For example, prior to enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Eighth Circuit utilized
the law of privilege of the forum state in federal question cases. Love v. United States, 386
F.2d 260 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 985 (1968). The Ninth Circuit held that in
the absence of a clear congressional mandate, state law should govern. Baird v. Koerner, 279
F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960), noted in 49 CALIF. L. REv. 382 (1961); 109 U. PA. L. REv. 1030 (1961).
The majority of circuits, however, have applied the federal common law of privilege, notwithstanding the existence of pendent state claims. See, e.g., Carr v. Monroe Mfg. Co., 431 F.2d
384 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1000 (1971); Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093
(5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971); In re Albert Lindley Memorial Hosp., 209
F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 960 (1954). See generally Louisell,
Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privilegesin the Federal Courts Today, 31 TUL.
L. REv. 101 (1956).
In cases based on diversity of citizenship, federal courts have held that the privilege is a
substantive right governed by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Accordingly, in such
actions courts will apply the privilege law of the forum state. See, e.g., Hyde Constr. Co. v.
Koehring Co., 455 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1972); Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d
551 (2d Cir. 1967) (dictum); New York Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Constr. Co., 285 F.
Supp. 868 (D. Kan. 1968) (mem.). Contra, Scourtes v. Fred W. Albrecht Grocery Co., 15
F.R.D. 55 (N.D. Ohio 1953) (per curiam). See generally 4 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
26.60[71 (2d ed. 1976).
To rectify such problems, detailed rules concerning the thrust of the privilege were
proposed. Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts and Magistrates,
R. 5-03 (Preliminary Draft 1969), in 46 F.R.D. 161, 249. The Advisory Committee proposed
13 separate rules concerning the scope of the privilege. Congress, however, opted for one
general rule which effectively settled only the choice of law problem by providing the privilege
to be a substantive question governed by Erie principles. See H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong.,
1st. Sess. (1973).
' See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ill.), opinion
supplemented, 209 F. Supp. 321 (N.D. Ill. 1962), rev'd, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963), discussed in notes 17-21 and accompanying text infra.
I See, e.g., Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 263 app. I (1964) ("a corporation like any other
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to determine which agents of the corporation are entitled to have their
communications with counsel shielded by the privilege. Many courts have
extended the benefits of the privilege only to those agents of the corporation who possess a high degree of control over the corporate decisionmaking
process." Other courts have developed a more liberal rule, holding that
nearly all corporate agents who speak with counsel about corporate activities are entitled to invoke the privilege on its behalf." Recently, one court,
dissatisfied with the limitations inherent in either approach, has fashioned
a new test in an attempt to attune the corporate client's privilege more
closely to modern business realities. 12
At the same time, the class of persons against whom the corporation's
privilege may be invoked has been restricted. This development has been
most noticeable in shareholder suits in which management attempts to
assert the privilege against those people who are, in actuality, the owners
of the corporate client. In such instances, courts have weighed the corporation's right to the privilege against the purposes to be served by disclosure
and, in many cases, have held that the privilege does not attach. Thus, in
situations where a fiduciary relationship exists between the corporation
and its shareholders, a number of courts have refused, upon a showing of
good cause by plaintiff shareholders, to allow the attorney-client privilege
to be invoked in the corporation's behalf. 3 Recently, in the context of
parent-subsidiary relations, in which the parent corporation serves in a
dual fiduciary capacity, viz., to its own shareholders on the one hand, and
the minority shareholders of its subsidiary on the other, it has been held
that the interest of the minority shareholders of the subsidiary outweighs
any necessity for the parent to invoke the privilege in suits between them. 4
This represents yet another constriction of the class of persons against
'client' is entitled to invoke the attorney-client privilege"); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American
Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963), rev'g, 207 F.
Supp. 771 (N.D. Il. 1962) (recognition of privilege afforded to corporate client). See also
Heininger, The Attorney-Client Privilegeas It Relates to Corporations,53 ILL. B.J. 376 (1965):
" See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa.),
mandamus and prohibition denied sub nom. General Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742
(3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963), discussed innotes 24-32 and accompanying
text infra.
" See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970) (per
curiam), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971), discussed in notes
38-43 and accompanying text infra. Contra, Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun Shipbuilding
& Dry Dock Co., 68 F.R.D. 397, 400 (E.D. Va. 1975) ("rule most likely to obtain the greatest
discovery" should be applied).
'1 See Duplan Corp. v. Deering-Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146 (D.S.C. 1975), discussed in
notes 52-59 and accompanying text infra.
" See, e.g., Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974
(1971), discussed in notes 86-95 and accompanying text infra.
" See Valente v. PepsiCo, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 361 (D. Del. 1975) (mem.).
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whom the corporation's privilege may be claimed. Opportunities for abuse
are many in these situations and close scrutiny by the courts is necessary."5
In light of the aforementioned considerations, it is clear that without
unifying guidelines balkanization of the attorney-client privilege in the
federal courts will continue, effectively jeopardizing its operation. As various courts attempt to delineate the scope of the privilege, further segmentation will necessarily result, thereby eroding the certainty which is necessary to ensure the proper functioning of any evidentiary privilege. This
Note will attempt to reconcile the mass of conflicting precedents dealing
with the privilege and propose what is hoped will be a workable attorneyclient privilege in the corporate arena.
AVAILABILITY OF THE PRIVILEGE TO THE CORPORATE CLIENT

It had long been assumed by both courts and commentators that the
corporation was to be considered a client for purposes of invoking the
attorney-client privilege.'" In 1962, however, in a decision of far-reaching
importance, Judge Campbell, in Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas
Association," refused to extend the privilege to an association of natural
gas utilities on the theory that the privilege was intended to "be claimed
only by natural individuals and not by mere corporate entities."' 8 Though
See notes 112-161 and accompanying text infra.
See, e.g., United States v. Louisville & Nash. R.R., 236 U.S. 318 (1915), a mandamus action
brought by the ICC to compel defendants to permit inspection of their accounts, correspondence, and records. Upon a plea by the railroads objecting to disclosure, the Court ruled that
the inspection could not "include the confidential correspondence of the railroad companies
between itself and its counsel ....
" Id. at 336. See also Cole v. Hughes Tool Co., 215 F.2d
924, 930-31 (10th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 927 (1955); Ellis-Foster Co. v. Union
Carbide & Carbon Corp., 159 F. Supp. 917 (D.N.J. 1958); Simon, supra note 3, at 953; note
9 supra.
11207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ill.), opinion supplemented, 209 F. Supp. 321 (N.D. Ill. 1962), rev'd,
320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963).
" 207 F. Supp. at 773. In reaching its conclusion, the court first determined that the matter
of the iorporate privilege was an open question and then proceeded to hold that no such
privilege existed. Initially, the court noted that the privilege is historically and fundamentally
personal in nature and that a corporation should not be afforded a privilege originally created
to benefit natural persons. The court analogized the attorney-client privilege to the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination which is not available to artificial persons.
See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906);
cf. Note, The Constitutional Rights of Associations to Assert the Privilege Against SelfIncrimination, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 394 (1964).
Furthermore, recognition of the attorney-client privilege requires that the communications originate in confidence and continue to bear the cloak of confidentiality. See generally
8 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2311, at 599-603. The court noted that such confidentiality cannot
exist in the case of a corporation, which by its very nature can only communicate through
agents. Moreover, it would be difficult to determine which agents and papers should come
within the purview of the privilege. The court also recognized that directors of large corpora'5
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promptly reversed, 9 Radiant Burners has had a profound impact upon
later decisions which attempted to define and delineate the thrust of the
privilege available to the corporate client. Focusing upon the possibilities
of abuse which might result from permitting large corporations to assert
the privilege and thereby extend its "zone of silence" 0 beyond reasonable
bounds, courts influenced by Judge Campbell's decision have restricted
the number of agents of the corporation entitled to speak on its behalf.'
The Control Group Test
As the attorney-client privilege shields those communications made
by a client to his attorney,22 an interesting definitional problem immediately arises. A corporation, while an independent legal entity, is a fictional
person, and as such, can communicate only through its agents and employees. If the corporate client may be considered to speak through all of its
employees and agents, the scope of the privilege would be extended far
beyond reasonable bounds. Thus, the relationship between the communicating agent and the corporate client must be analyzed to determine
whether the agent is acting for the corporation in its capacity as a client
and whether the communicating agent has authority to speak for the corporation in matters touching upon the asserted attorney-client relation3
ship.
tions often constitute the controlling factor of different companies with whom business is
transacted, a consideration further militating against confidentiality. 207 F. Supp. at 774.
Lastly, Judge Campbell, noting that the visitatorial powers of the state weaken the confidential nature of corporate records, declared that "[olne of the prices one pays for the limitation
of personal liability through incorporation is the loss of personal privileges one might otherwise have in individual business transactions." Id. at 775.
" Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963) rev'g, 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ill.
1962). In reversing Judge
Campbell's decision, the Seventh Circuit noted that corporations have always enjoyed the
benefits of the privilege and "[the privilege is that of a 'client' without regard to the noncorporate or corporate character of the client..." 320 F.2d at 322. It is now clear that "a
corporation like any other 'client' is entitled to the attorney-client privilege." Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 263 app.I (1964).
'*Simon, supra note 3, at 955.
U See notes 28-30 and accompanying text infra.
22 The converse is also true: the attorney-client privilege protects communications made in
confidence by the attorney to his client. See, e.g., Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686, 692-93 (10th
Cir. 1968); Hesselbine v. von Wedel, 44 F.R.D. 431, 433 (W.D. Okla. 1968). The privilege also
affords protection to communications between the attorney and his representative or agent
whose consultation is necessary to protect the client's interests. See, e.g., United States v.
Judson, 322 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1963) (accountant's report privileged).
11A balance must be struck, therefore, between two competing interests. If all agents and
employees of the corporation were permitted to invoke the privilege on its behalf, the scope
of the corporate attorney-client privilege would extend far beyond that allowed to the individ-
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The first significant effort to deal with this problem was made in City
of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.," wherein the court held
that only those persons vested with upper level decisionmaking power were
entitled to invoke the privilege on behalf of the corporate client. The
court's holding, however, was foreshadowed by the Supreme Court's earlier
decision in Hickman v. Taylor.25
In Hickman, the Court refused to extend the cloak of privilege to
reports and interviews garnered by an attorney, retained by a partnership
of tugboat owners, from the captain and crew of a tug involved in a fatal
accident. Treating the employees as mere witnesses or third parties to the
accident, the Court apparently gave no significance to the fact that the
interviewees were also employees of the client, speaking to the client's
attorney concerning matters involving the client's interest.' Insofar as the
employees were not deemed to be spokesmen of the client for purposes of
.invoking the privilege," Hickman thereby furnished the Philadelphiacourt
ual client. In contrast, if the corporate entity alone was designated as the client, thereby
denominating all its agents and employees as third parties, statements of all corporate agents
necessarily would be reduced to an unprivileged status, leaving the corporate client powerless
to engage in any type of privileged communication. Inasmuch as the purpose of the privilege,
the encouragement of communication between attorney and client, would be defeated, clear
delineation of which agents are entitled to speak on behalf of the corporate client is vital to
ensure its successful operation.
11 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa.), mandamus and prohibition denied sub nom. General Elec.
Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963).
25 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
,1Id. at 508. In reaching its conclusion, the Court was aware of the conflicting principles
embodied in the federal discovery rules. Rule 26, for example, only extends its coverage to
those matters "not privileged." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b). On the other hand, the Court declared
liberal discovery demands "[miutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both
parties [which] is essential to proper litigation." 329 U.S. at 507. Since in Hickman the
communications made to the attorney were not for the purpose of charting a course of action
in the future, but rather "in anticipation of litigation," reliance upon the attorney-client
privilege was inapposite. Id. at 508. See also Simon, supra note 3, at 958.
" While the Hickman Court did not grant privileged status to the attorney's reports, the
decision is better known for the qualified immunity from discovery granted to reports, mental
impressions, and other writings prepared by an attorney in anticipation of litigation. The
Court labelled preparation of this type the attorney's "work product." 329 U.S. at 511.
Cognizant of the privacy historically recognized as necessary for counsel to prepare his client's
case, the Court ruled that the mental processes of the attorney could not be probed absent
exigent circumstances. Id.
Thus, discovery of an attorney's work product has been allowed only in circumstances
where the opposing party makes a special showing of necessity or justification. See, e.g.,
Xerox Corp. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 64 F.R.D. 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (substantial need shown where defendant conceals information known only to it under the guise of
work product); Hanson v. Gartland S.S. Co., 34 F.R.D. 493 (N.D. Ohio 1964) (allowing
discovery of statements of seamen witnesses, who because of nature of occupation could not
be located). See generally Note, Attorney's Work-Product Privilege in the Federal Courts, 42
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 560 (1968).
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with the basis for its narrow delineation of which employees of the corporate client are entitled to speak on its behalf.
The Philadelphiacourt, while refusing to follow the holding of Radiant
Burners, nevertheless was mindful of the possible abuses inherent in an
overly broad privilege adverted to by Judge Campbell." Seizing upon the
5 the Philadelphiacourt exreasoning of the Supreme Court in Hickman,"
tended the benefits of the attorney-client privilege only to an employee
who
is in a position to control or even to take a substantial part in a decision about
any action which the corporation may take upon the advice of the attorney,
On the other hand, documents not prepared in anticipation of litigation do not constitute
the attorney's work product, though they may fall under some other privilege. See, e.g.,
United States v. Illinois Fair Plan Ass'n, 67 F.R.D. 659 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (documents not part
of counsel's work product but may not be discoverable because of executive privilege); Stix
Prods., Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 47 F.R.D. 334, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (to be
considered prepared in anticipation of litigation, documents must be "identifiable because
of specific claims that have already arisen ......
21The Philadelphiacourt, while conceding that the Radiant Burners decision was "supported
by a good deal of history and sound logic," nevertheless felt constrained to recognize the
existence of a corporate attorney-client privilege. The court noted that its existence "has gone
unchallenged so long and has been so generally accepted that I must recognize that it does
exist." 210 F. Supp. at 484.
21 The court was careful to note that, regardless of the employee's position in the corporate
hierarchy, if the communication to the attorney was "relative to pending litigation" it was
not privileged. Id. at 485. Upon first blush it might seem that the Philadelphiacourt deprived
the corporation of the opportunity to assert the attorney-client privilege in this context. It
appears, however, that the court raised this point only to distinguish statements of third
parties or mere witnesses from those of the corporate client.
In contrast to the Philadelphiacourt's distinction between mere witnesses and privileged
agents of the corporate client is an earlier decision in United States v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950). In United Shoe, a civil antitrust action, the court
held that information furnished to the corporation's attorney from any employee of the
corporate client fell within the ambit of the privilege. Hickman, the United Shoe court
declared, came into play only where reports furnished to counsel originated "outside the
organization of defendant and its affiliates .... " Id. at 359. Such reports would comprise
the attorney's work product and would be discoverable by an adversary upon a showing of
good cause. See note 27 supra.
The distinction between the formulations arrived at in United Shoe and the Philadelphia
court's interpretation of Hickman are more than differences in degree. While in certain cases
the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine produce similar results, i.e. nondisclosure of certain attorney-client communications, they have dissimilar theoretical bases.
As one court has remarked:
The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to encourage full disclosure of information between an attorney and his client by guarantying the inviolability of their confidential communications. The "work product of the attorney", on the other hand, is
accorded protection for the purpose of preserving our adversary system of litigation by
assuring an attorney that his private files shall . .'. remain free from the encroachments of opposing counsel.
Scourtes v. Fred W. Albrecht Grocery Co., 15 F.R.D. 55, 58 (N.D. Ohio 1953).
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or if he is an authorized member of a body or group which has that authority,
then, in effect, he is (or personifies) the corporation when he makes his
disclosure to the lawyer and the privilege would apply. 0

Utilization of the control group test mandates, then, that only those
employees of the corporation who have actual authority to take part in the
decisionmaking process be afforded the opportunity to invoke the privilege
on behalf of the corporation." In striving to equate the attorney-client
privilege in the corporate context with the privilege involved in purely
personal communications made by an individual client to his attorney, the
Philadelphiacourt viewed the client as being only those representatives of
the corporation who seek legal advice on its behalf; all other employees not
vested with this high level of decisionmaking authority are considered
mere witnesses or third parties."
The attractiveness of the control group test is due, in large part, to the
ease of its application and the certainty which necessarily results from the
formulation of a "bright-line rule." 33 Unfortunately, the test ignores the
dual role of the modem corporate client. To function effectively, a corporation necessarily requires the services of an attorney to guide it through a
maze of securities, antitrust, and tax statutes and regulations. Likewise,
the corporation requires the services of an attorney to assist it in the prepa30 210 F. Supp. at 485.

, The court was careful to note that mere labels of authority in and of themselves are not
sufficient to allow the corporate employee to invoke the privilege. Denominating someone a
"manager" without affording him the power that would ordinarily run with the title is not
sufficient to permit him to invoke the benefits of the privilege on behalf of the corporation.
Conversely, one who does possess power to formulate the business policy of his corporation
would be deemed a member of the corporate control group regardless of title. Id. at 485-86.
Thus, in Garrison v. General Motors Corp., 213 F. Supp. 515 (S.D. Cal. 1963), the court
examined the duties of those employees working in the corporation's patent department to
determine whether they were entitled to invoke the privilege on behalf of the corporation. The
court concluded that "officers, directors, department heads of GMC," including the division
manager of a GMC subsidiary, his assistant and chief engineer, were vested with sufficient
power to be deemed members of the control group. Id. at 518. See also Natta v. Hogan, 392
F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968).
" Of course, if not a member of the corporate control group, it is possible that the employee's
communications could be afforded the more limited protection of the work product doctrine,
note 27 supra. The protection accorded these communications, however, would be less than
complete because they would have to be produced upon a showing of good cause by an
adversary.
See Note, Attorney-Client Privilege for Corporate Clients: The Control Group Test, 84
HARV. L. REV. 424, 430-32 (1970). Further, by drafting a narrow test regarding the availability
of the privilege to the corporate client, the amount of material not privileged and therefore
discoverable by an adversary is great, thereby augmenting the current trend towards increased pretrial disclosure of information between parties. See note 6 and accompanying text
supra.
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ration of a defense when charged with violation of the law." In the case of
an individual client, communications made to the attorney in both contexts would fall within the ambit of the privilege. The corporate client,
however, would receive the benefits of the privilege under this test only if
the top echelon of the decisionmaking group were involved in the attorneyclient communications.
Such an anomalous result ignores the realities of modern corporate
decisionmaking, in which top level management does not necessarily make
the day-to-day decisions which allow the corporation to remain a viable
force in the marketplace. 5 It must be assumed that any consultation between a corporate decisionmaker and an attorney is for the purpose of
keeping corporate activities within the law. To permit discovery of the
options presented by counsel to lower level management, while shielding
those opinions rendered to persons within a narrowly drawn corporate
control group, necessarily discourages those not members of the control
group from seeking legal advice from the corporation's attorneys." As one
commentator has remarked, "[iut would better serve the interests of society to encourage a desire for legal advice at whatever level that desire
exists within a corporation." 37
The Subject Matter Test
Aware of the harshness and inequitable consequences which result
from the mechanical application of the control group test, the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in 1970, formulated new criteria for ascertaining which employees can speak on behalf of the corporate client and
yet have their communications retain their privileged character. In Harper
1

See note 39 infra. See also Burnham, The Attorney-ClientPrivilege in the CorporateArena,
24 Bus. LAW. 901, 913-14 (1969).
' For decisionmaking purposes, the corporation's board of directors is responsible for originating the business policies of the corporation and officers elected by the board are entrusted
with the management of the day-to-day affairs of the corporation, within the guidelines set
by the board. See generally H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 119-20 (rev. ed. 1946). It would be
a mistake to assume, however, that top level management, whose communications fall within
the ambit of the privilege, are involved in such day-to-day considerations as the hiring and
discharging of employees or the selection of suppliers. Cf. Simon, supra note 3, at 963-66.
36 It must be borne in mind that the primary purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to
facilitate communications between attorney and client by ensuring that they remain confidential. See notes 3-5 and accompanying text supra. The corporation, in its role as client,
necessarily requires the same unrestricted flow of information between itself and counsel as
does the individual client. Hence, regardless of the level within the decisionmaking group
from which the communication originates, the privilege should function "as an encouragement to all, strong and weak alike, to consult freely with counsel." Simon, supra note 3, at
955.
3' Kobak, The Uneven Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Corporationsin the
Federal Courts, 6 GA. L. REv. 339, 368 (1972).
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& Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker,38 a private antitrust action, plaintiffs
sought discovery of memoranda drafted by defendant's attorneys pursuant
to their debriefing of corporate employees after grand jury appearances.
Since the employees from whom the statements were taken were not members of the rigidly defined corporate control group, the district court held
the communications were not privileged and ordered their production."0
On mandamus, the Seventh Circuit vacated the order of the district
court, concluding that the control group test was "not wholly adequate."4
In its stead, the Harper & Row court developed a new test, designed to
extend the benefits of the attorney-client privilege to a larger class of
employees. Pursuant to this test, the employee,
though not a member of [the corporation's] control group, is sufficiently
identified with the corporation so that his communication to the corporation's attorney is privileged where the employee makes the communication
at the direction of his superiors in the corporation and where the subject upon
which the attorney's advice is sought by the corporation and dealt with in
the communication is the performance by the employee of the duties of his
employment."
Thus, regardless of the employee's position in the corporate hierarchy, as
long as the corporate employee is speaking to the attorney regarding matters involved in his duties as an employee, the conversation will be deemed
privileged and immune from discovery.
Nevertheless, the court was careful to distinguish between those matters in which the employee was acting within the scope of his employment,
and those in which the employee was communicating to the attorney as a
mere bystander witness. Such events would fall under the rule articulated
u 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970) (per curiam), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court,

400 U.S. 348 (1971).
31 Illinois

v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 37 (N.D.Ill.
1969) (mem.), rev'd per
curiam sub nom. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), aff'd
per curiam by an equally divided Court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971). The district court ruled that
defendant's sales executives and district managers, although responsible for the pricing considerations in issue, were not me'mbers of the corporate control group for purposes of the
instant litigation. The court's reasoning clearly illustrates the dual nature of the corporate
client: While declining to express an opinion as to whether the employees would be considered
members of the control group with respect to their pricing decisions, the court did express
the opinion that they were not deemed members of the control group with respect to their
activities aiding the corporation in the preparation of its defense, i.e., "the company's litigation response to the price fixing cases." 50 F.R.D. at 44.
11423 F.2d at 491. Noting that the district court's application of the control group test was
correct, the Seventh Circuit was nevertheless aware of the inherent inequity which would
result from allowing discovery of communications made to counsel at the direction of the
corporate client and whose "subject matter . . . was germane to the duties of his
employment." Id.
1 Id. at 491-92.
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in Hickman v. Taylor, and therefore, would be discoverable by an adversary.42 By rejecting the restrictive confines of the control group test, while
at the same time paying lip service to the unprivileged status of mere
witnesses, the Harper& Row court was able to formulate a test which more
closely conforms to the realities of modern corporate decisionmaking.43
The test formulated in Harper & Row, however, does have one glaring
fault. In supplanting the bright-line rule of the control group test, the
Seventh Circuit failed to articulate any discernable guidelines for determining whether an employee is within the confines of the attorney-client
privilege." In excluding mere witnesses as a class to whom the privilege is
available, without giving an indication of how the term should be defined
and distinguished from past application in cases such as Hickman or
Philadelphia,the certainty necessary for uniform application of the privilege is lacking. 5 After Harper & Row attorneys interviewing a corporate
42

This result would seem to be compelled not only by Hickman, but also by virtue of a

decision rendered by the Seventh Circuit 1 year prior to its decision in Harper & Row. In
Rucker v. Wabash R.R., 418 F.2d 146 (7th Cir. 1969), a personal injury action resulting from
a collision between an automobile and a train, the Seventh Circuit panel refused to allow the
railroad to assert the privilege for statements made by the train crew to private investigators,
noting that, "[nione were of such rank as to qualify as representative of the corporate
client." Id. at 154. Clearly, such situations would not fall within the ambit of the attorneyclient privilege regardless of which test is utilized, since employees who by mere happenstance witness an accident are, in all cases, merely third parties to the litigation.
" The subject matter test formulated in Harper & Row closely conforms to that utilized by
California courts. See, e.g., D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. 2d 723, 388 P.2d
700, 36 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1964). In Chadbourne, the California Supreme Court developed its
own criteria for ascertaining which corporate employees are entitled to speak on behalf of the
corporation for the purpose of invoking the attorney-client privilege. The court listed eleven
considerations to assist in that determination. In distinguishing corporate employees who are
entitled to invoke the privilege on behalf of the corporation from mere witnesses, the court
hinged the availability of the privilege on whether the employee's "statement contained any
material or information which could not have been known to a nonemployee witness ...
"
Id. at 738, 388 P.2d at 710, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 478. Chadbourne has been termed a more precise
determination of this question than Harper & Row, but one which remains difficult to apply.
Note, Attorney-Client Privilege for Corporate Clients: The Control Group Test, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 424, 433 n.29 (1970).
" Apparently, application of the subject matter test requires a two-step determination. First,
the employee must furnish the attorney information which he has acquired from the exercise
of his duties of employment. 423 F.2d at 490-91. Second, the method by which the employee
became aware of the information must be consistent with the employment relationship; the
information cannot have been gleaned in the employee's individual capacity. Although these
determinations would presumably be made in accord with normal agency concepts, a clear
definition of duties of employment is difficult. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 229 (1958).
11The control group test treats those employees not vested with high decisionmaking authority as third parties to the attorney-client relationship. The subject matter test, on the other
hand, envisages protection for communications by those employees who have acquired information during the course of their employment, but excludes from its scope declarations by
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employee will not know in advance whether the conversation will be subject to discovery.4" On the other hand, by leaving the delineation of the
subject matter test to future judicial interpretation, the decision may result in expansion of the scope of the attorney-client privilege far beyond
its intended limitations."
It must be borne in mind that as the attorney-client privilege constitutes a recognized exception to the liberal atmosphere of discovery in the
federal courts, its boundaries must be strictly circumscribed. 8 Whereas
application of a rigidly defined control group test may impede corporate
communication, utilization of a vaguely defined subject matter test, as
espoused in Harper& Row, may require case-by-case determination of the
status of employee's communications, thus rendering its application unworkable in the corporate arena. What is necessary to remedy this difficulty is a consistent and universally accepted privilege in the corporate
context which will encourage corporations to seek the legal advice of counsel, and yet, at the same time, will not extend beyond reasonable bounds
the "zone of silence" which the privilege engenders.
The Expanded Control Group Test
The only federal courts which have utilized the subject matter test
enunciated in Harper & Row have been located within the Seventh Circuit.4 9 While some courts have consistently adhered to the rigid application
of the control group test,5 others have felt the harshness of the test inappropriate and have formulated criteria of their own.5
these same persons should they be mere witnesses. Due to the ambiguity of the definition of
a bystander witness in Harper & Row, future courts may treat an employee not a member of
the control group as a mere witness, thereby rendering the subject matter test impotent in
the corporate arena.
" See, e.g., Kobak, The Uneven Application of the Attorney-Client Privilegeto Corporations
in the Federal Courts, 6 GA. L. REV. 339, 367 (1972).
17It is important to note that public policy necessitates that the privilege shield only those
communi'cations vital for the corporate client's protection. As one commentator has remarked: "Where corporations are involved, with their large number of agents, masses of
documents, and frequent dealings with lawyers, the zone of silence grows [perhaps unnecessarily] large." Simon, supra note 3, at 955.
" See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
" See, e.g., Sylgab Steel & Wire Corp. v. Imoco-Gateway Corp., 62 F.R.D. 454 (N.D. II1. 1974)
(mem.), aff'd without opinion, 534 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1976); Rockwell Mfg. Co. v. Chicago
Pneumatic Tool Co., 57 F.R.D. 111 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (mem.).
See, e.g., Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 68 F.R.D. 397
(E.D. Va. 1975) (subject matter test runs afoul of liberal discovery atmosphere); Burlington
Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26 (D. Md. 1974); Honeywell, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,
50 F.R.D. 117, 120 n.1 (M.D. Pa. 1970) (impossible to determine whether employees acting
within scope of employment).
11See, e.g., Eutectic Corp. v. Metco, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 35 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (mem.). In Eutectic
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Perhaps the best method yet advanced to ascertain which employees
are entitled to speak on behalf of the corporate client was announced in
Duplan Corp. v. Deering-Milliken, Inc."2 In that multidistrict patent and
antitrust action, Judge Hemphill took a "common sense look at the practicalities of the 'control group' test and its applicability in the day-to-day
workings of a lawyer,"' 3 and developed a two-part test combining elements
of both the control group and the subject matter tests.
Realizing that a narrow definition of the corporate control groups,
such as formulated by the Philadelphiacourt, is not suited to the workings
of a modern corporation, 4 the court first expanded its scope. For the
attorney-client privilege to attach, according to the Duplan court, the
communication must first be directed to or from a member of the corporate
control group 5 5 or an employee acting at the behest of one of its members.
Thus, no simple definition of whom the communication must be from is
possible, since "the main consideration is whether the particular representative of the client . . is involved in . . . the decisionmaking process
concerning a problem on which legal advice is sought."5 6
The second phase of the Duplan test is more precise. If the
communication was from a member of the control group or one acting at
Corp., a patent infringement action, the court declined to formulate a new test regarding
which corporate employees could claim the protection of the privilege. Instead, the court
looked to a number of factors in ascertaining whether the employees involved had acted as
representatives of the client, "including but not limited to: the nature and content of the
communications, the extent of their disclosure within the corporation, and the relationship
of the employees involved to the communication and to the corporation ..
" Id. at 40. In
upholding the defendant's claim of privilege, the Eutectic court apparently followed the
reasoning of Harper & Row. It was, however, careful to note that its decision was confined
solely to the facts and circumstances of the case before it. Id. The Eutectic decision, while
having little precedential value, can nevertheless be considered evidence of at least one
court's desire to break away from an objective application of the control group test.
52 397 F. Supp. 1146 (D.S.C. 1974).
Id. at 1164.
In commenting upon the necessity that the corporate control group be enlarged, the Duplan
court declared:
There has to be a sufficient number of persons within a corporation who are authorized
on behalf of the corporation to seek advice, to give information with respect to the
rendition of advice, and to receive advice. A corporate system would break down if such
were not permissible.
If only one, two, three, or four persons within a corporate structure could be the
corporation when it must seek legal advice, then, for all practical purposes, any corporation would not have an effective attorney-client privilege. The chairman of the board
and other top executives necessarily have more important matters to attend to than
gathering information. ...
Id.
s Id. at 1163.
5' Id. at 1165.
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his direction the court will then apply the subject matter test and focus
upon whether "[t]he communication [was] incident to a request for the
rendition of legal advice.""7 When both criteria are met, the communication will be deemed privileged and immune from discovery.
Thus, instead of hinging the availability of the attorney-client privilege on the employee's merely being engaged in the duties of his employment, as in Harper& Row, or being a member of a small corporate control
group, as in Philadelphia,Duplan extends the privilege to those employees
actually involved in formulating the business policy of the corporation.
Further, there is no need to engage in time consuming and subjective
considerations to determine whether the employee involved was a mere
witness or was acting in the scope of his employment.5 8 The needs of the
corporation, functioning in its dual role as a client, are then served in much
the same way as those of the individual client. Communications, whether
they be from one seeking advice as to the course of conduct to be pursued
in the future or from one supplying information to counsel regarding impending litigation, are privileged if they originate from a member of this
"expanded control group."59
It is submitted that the expanded control group test of Duplan is preferrable, due to its increased certainty and in its advancement of the
policies underlying the existence of the attorney-client privilege, to either
of the earlier formulations. The ability to control or substantially affect the
corporation's business policy, which is the thrust of the control group test,
has been retained and expanded to reflect the realities of modern corporate
decisionmaking. Thus, certainty and ease of application, one of the attributes cited by supporters of the control group test, is maintained. The
corporate attorney, who must plot his course of action based upon the
availability of the privilege, is also furnished with discernable guidelines.
A case-by-case resolution of the problem can thus be avoided, while the
number of employees deemed to be representing the corporate client will
be limited to a well-defined group.
57 Id.

See note 59 infra.
s, Problems may arise, however, in ascertaining whether an employee is acting under the

direction of a member of the corporate control group for purposes of invoking the attorneyclient privilege. It is submitted that utilization of the expanded control group test as set forth
in Duplan extends the privilege to those under a general grant of authority by a member of
the control group. Thus, an employee such as a regional office manager under instructions
from the board of directors to "maximize corporate profits" would be able to use the independent authority granted him by the control group and still fall within the ambit of the privilege. For an examination and analysis of another proposed test which closely resembles that
of Duplan, see Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Setting: A Suggested
Approach, 69 MICH. L. REV. 360, 379 (1970). See also Comment, The Privileged Few: The
Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations,20 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 288 (1972).
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EXCEPTIONS TO THE PRIVILEGE

In certain factual situations, although the communications to an attorney meet the normal requirements for a claim to privilege, the privilege
does not attach. One such situation has been labeled the prospective crime
or fraud exception. Briefly, this doctrine states that any communications
made by a client to his attorney concerning prospective illegal activities
does not involve the professional relationship between the parties, and thus
vitiates the confidentiality of the communications. 0
Another well-recognized exception to the attorney-client privilege
arises in situations in which the same attorney serves in his capacity as
such' for two different clients who later find themselves opposing each
other in litigation. According to Wigmore, communications from one client

to the joint attorney, "are not privileged in a controversy between the two
original parties, inasmuch as the common interest and employment forbade concealment by either from the other."62 The rationale for such a rule
is clear: an attorney acting as agent for two clients cannot prevent one
client from obtaining information regarding whether the attorney has per3
mitted one client's interest to predominate over the other's. It should be
noted, however, that insofar as third parties are concerned, the communications retain their privileged nature. 4
The exception has enjoyed wide popularity in the insured-insurer context. In the majority of instances, the joint attorney exception arises in
suits brought against an insurer by an insured claiming bad faith or negligence in the handling of his claim.6" Thus, expeditious settlement of the
See generally 8 WIGMORE," supra note 1, §§ 2298-99, at 572-80. The touchstone for the
vitiation of a privilege in this context is Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1932), discussed
in notes 67-68 and accompanying text infra. The Court indicated in Clark that if evidence is
presented which gives color to the charge that the client has engaged in or seeks legal advice
for the purpose of engaging in future criminal or fraudulent activity, an evidentiary privilege
will be defeated. Id. at 13-16.
" It is interesting to note that bar membership, in and of itself, is not sufficient to allow the
client to assert that his communications with counsel fall within the ambit of the privilege.
Intercourse with counsel must deal primarily with legal advice arising out of the attorneyclient relationship in order for the privilege to attach. Thus, in United States v. United Shoe
Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 360 (D. Mass. 1950), the court refused to extend the privilege
to communications from persons functioning primarily as patent agents, notwithstanding
prior legal education or bar membership, noting: "Grist which comes to their mill has a higher
percentage of business content than legal content." Accord, Lowy v. Commissioner, 262 F.2d
809 (2d Cir. 1959) (attorney acting as business associate); United States v. Vehicular Parking,
Ltd., 52 F. Supp. 751 (D. Del. 1943) (attorney serving as business negotiator); In re Fisher,
51 F.2d 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1931) (attorney serving as bankrupt's accountant).
128 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2312, at 603-04.
'3See, e.g., Shapiro v. Allstate Ins. Co., 44 F.R.D. 429, 431 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (mem.).
"' See, e.g., Grand Trunk W.R.R. v. H.W. Nelson Co., 116 F.2d 823, 835 (6th Cir. 1941).
"' Parties to an insurance contract are normally said to be in a debtor-creditor relationship.
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litigation hinges upon the tripartite communications between attorney,
insurer, and insured. Accordingly, courts do not permit the insurer to
invoke the attorney-client privilege, since both parties in the suit necessarily had to communicate to the same attorney in order to pursue their
interests."
ROLE OF THE PRIVILEGE IN SHAREHOLDER SUITS

In situations in which the potential injury resulting from nondisclosure of relevant information conflicts with the probable benefits of divulgence of these heretofore privileged communications, these interests must
be balanced. The classic pronouncement of the test employed in such
situations, in an analogous context, was voiced by Justice Cardozo in Clark
7
v. United States:6
[R]ecognition of a privilege does not mean that it is without conditions or
exceptions. The social policy that will prevail in many situations may run
foul in others of a different social policy, competing for supremacy. It is then
the function of a court to mediate between them, assigning, so far as possible,
a proper value to each, and summoning to its aid all the distinctions and
analogies that are the tools of the judicial process."8
In handling a claim of the insured, however, the status of the parties changes so that the
insurer is placed in a relationship of "trust and confidence" with the insured, thus mandating
that a good faith effort be expended by the insurer in the settlement of the claim. 3 G. COUcH,
CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 23:11, at 11-13 (2d ed. 1960).
" See, e.g., LaRocca v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 47 F.R.D. 278 (W.D. Pa. 1969);
Shapiro v. Allstate Ins. Co., 44 F.R.D. 429 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (mem.); Chitty v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 36 F.R.D. 37 (E.D.S.C. 1964).
67 289 U.S. 1 (1932).
1 Id. at 13. In Clark, the Court was called upon to balance the common law privilege accorded
jury considerations and balloting against disclosure for the purpose of showing active concealment by a juror during the voir dire examination. Recognizing that "[flreedom of debate
might be stifled and independence of thought checked if jurors were made to feel that their
arguments and ballots were to be freely published to the world," the Court nevertheless held
that active concealment on the part of a juror vitiates the privilege. Id. at 13, 18-19.
The reasoning of Clark has since been applied in various situations wherein the existence
of an evidentiary privilege conflicts with some higher social value. Thus, in United States v.
Bartlett, 449 F.2d 700 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 932 (1972), an attorney who was
a member of a law firm representing the Arkansas Loan & Thrift Co. and who had attended
the directors' meeting of the company was permitted to testify in a securities fraud prosecution against the chief executive officer of the company notwithstanding the purported existence of the attomey-client privilege. Accord, United States v. Bob, 106 F.2d 37 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 308 U.S. 589 (1939); cf. Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 497 F.2d
1190 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1974) (attorney-client privilege inapplicable where
attorney deposes as to own noninvolvement in alleged securities fraud). See also Garner v.
Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971).
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FiduciaryDuty of Directors, Officers, and Controlling Shareholders
It is a well-established principle of corporate law that one who controls
the affairs of a corporation or is responsible for the formulation of corporate
policy owes a fiduciary duty to that corporation and its shareholders."9
Thus, officers,7" directors, 7 and controlling shareholders72 are charged with
a high degree of care since they are dealing with the interests of the shareholders and the corporation. The extent of and applicable standards for
these fiduciary duties have given rise to much litigation; indeed, one court
has noted: "[T]he doctrine of the fiduciary relation is one of the most
confused and entangled subjects in corporation law." 73
In the earlier cases, a director or controlling shareholder of a corporation occupying this fiduciary relationship frequently was denominated a
trustee and held accountable as such in equity.74 The basis for this trust'
relationship was that directors are charged with the guidance of the corporation's business policy and control of its assets, and therefore, are respon-

" See generally, 3 W.

FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS,

142-44 (perm. ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as
AND PRACTICE

FLETCHER];

1 G.

§ 838,

HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION

at
LAW

§ 432 (1959).

,"See, e.g., Woodson v. McAllister, 121 F.2d 126, 129 (5th Cir. 1941) (when corporate officers
bargain between themselves for corporate property, shareholder interests must be considered).
"' See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939); Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U.S.
(1 Otto) 587, 588 (1875); Koehler v. Black River Falls Iron Co., 67 U.S. (2 Black) 715, 719
(1862).
72 See, e.g., Mount v. Seagrave Corp., 112 F. Supp. 330 (S.D. Ohio 1953), aff'd, 212 F.2d 389
(6th Cir. 1954), wherein the court held that by virtue of their dominion and control of the
corporation and their representation by four of its seven directors, the controlling
shareholders were fiduciaries, exercising powers in trust for the corporation and the minority
shareholders.
Geller v. Transamerica Corp., 53 F. Supp. 625, 629 (D. Del. 1943).
" See, e.g., Ervin v. Oregon Ry. & Nay. Co., 27 F. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1886). There, the majority
shareholder of a steamship company contracted with a promoter to sell the controlling shares
in exchange for cash plus shares to be issued by the new corporation. Upon formation, the
new corporation assumed the contract of its promoter and made an offer to purchase the
property of the old company which was accepted by its board of directors. The purchase price,
which was less than the fair market value, was justified by the directors on the assumption
that the sale was advantageous under the circumstances since a new railroad to be constructed by the company would soon deplete existing steamship traffic. In resolving the
question before it, the court stated:
[Directors and controlling shareholders] become for all practical purposes the corporation itself, and assume the rust relation occupied by the corporation towards its
stockholders. . . .The corporation itself holds its property as a trust fund for the
stockholders . . . and the relation between it and its several members is, for all practical purposes, that of trustee and cestui que trust.
Id. at 631. Using this high standard of care, the court held that in dealing for themselves,
seeking profit at the expense of the minority, the majority shareholders were "guilty, at least,
of constructive fraud." Id. at 632.

22

CATHOLIC

LAWYER,

SPRING

1976

sible for the property interests of the shareholders. Thus, these interests
were deemed to be infused through the corporation to the directors, resulting in the creation of a trusteeship with its concomitant fiduciary duties."5
As both corporate size and sophistication grew, however, the analogy
between directors and trustees proved to be unduly burdensome. Legal
distinctions between trustees and directors became apparent;"6 yet directors have remained under a general fiduciary duty to deal fairly and in
good faith. 7 Whether a director is considered a trustee, fiduciary, or agent,
his acts affect the interests of the shareholders, and, consequently, his
dealings must be subjected to close scrutiny. As one court has noted,
"when all is said and done management is not managing for itself," therefore, its "judgment must stand on its merits, not behind an iron-clad veil
of secrecy which. . . preserves it from being questioned by those for whom
' 7
it is, at least in part, exercised. 1
The English Experience
Under English law, it appears that the relationship of director and
shareholder is treated as one between trustee and cestui que trust. Therefore, English courts have analogized suits by corporate shareholders
against their directors to suits by trust beneficiaries against their trustees.
The English cases, relying primarily upon trust principles, 79 do not recog7'See id; cf. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928).
71 Corporate directors, unlike trustees, do not hold legal title to the property entrusted to
them; they act under a general grant of power whereas a trustee's authority is strictly limited
to the terms of the trust. Moreover, in the usual course of business, a majority of the directors
may bind the corporation; actions by joint trustees, however, must be unanimous. G. BOGERT,
THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 16, at 94-98 (2d ed. 1965); Bosworth v. Allen, 168 N.Y.
157, 164, 61 N.E. 163, 164 (1901).
" See, e.g., United States v. Gates, 376 F.2d 65, 77 (10th Cir. 1967) (directors are trustees in
a limited sense, occupying fiduciary relationship with corporation and shareholders); 3
FLETCHER, supra note 69, § 838, at 142. Nevertheless, there is still relatively modern support
for the director-trustee analogy. See Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A
Note, 45 HARv. L. REV. 1365 (1932). But see Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers
Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932).
1' Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1101 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974
(1971).
" The English trust cases do not recognize the attorney-client privilege in situations where
the cestui que trust is the opponent and is seeking opinions of counsel rendered to the trustee
before the institution of the litigation paid for out of trust funds. See G. BOGERT, THE LAW
OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 961, at 9 (2d ed. 1965); In re Mason, [1883] 22 Ch. D. 609
(communications by trustee to counsel regarding trust matters before litigation instituted not
privileged). The most recent reaffirmation of the English principle was voiced in In re Londonderry's Settlement, [1964] 3 All E.R. 855, 863 (C.A.), wherein the court stated that "[i]f
the documents in question are in the possession or powers of the trustees and are relevant to
the issues in the action, they must be disclosed whether or not they are trust documents."
The rationale behind this principle was succinctly stated by the court: "[T]he beneficiaries
have a proprietary interest in the documents and, accordingly, are entitled to see them." Id.
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nize the privilege between attorney and client in cases wherein the legal
advice sought to be discovered was obtained before the present litigation
was contemplated and was paid for out of corporate assets.'" Curiously,
however, this principle does not seem to apply in cases in which the corporation has instituted an action against one of its shareholders, notwithstanding the fact that the opinion of counsel has similarly been paid for
out of corporate funds.8
The American Experience
Unlike the English decisions, which recognize that a trustee cannot
withhold relevant information from his beneficiary regardless of its privileged character, American courts have reached the opposite result. In In
re Prudence Bonds Corp., 2 holders of certain corporate bonds subject to a
trust indenture sought the production of opinions of counsel furnished to
the bond trustee during the administration of the trust and prior to the
advent of litigation. The court specifically declined to follow the reasoning
of the English decisions. 83 Utilizing a balancing approach in which it
weighed the benefit to the plaintiff bondholders against the harm which
would result to the trustee from permitting disclosure of the communications, the court concluded that the privileged status of the reports rendered
them immune from discovery. It was the opinion of the court that the
trustee should be free to seek legal advice and act according to his judgment aided by the opinion of counsel and uninfluenced by fear of disclosure."
Gouraud v. Edison Gower Bell Tel. Co., 57 L.J. Gh. 498 (1888). The court in Gouraud
declared:
[11n actions by a cestui que trust against a trustee . . . a party cannot resist production of documents which have been obtained by means of payments from the moneys
belonging to the party applying for their production. I think that this is the general
principle, and one which, to my mind, applies as between a shareholder and the
directors who manage his property, when the documents are paid for out of his property.
Id. at 499-500. Accord, Dennis & Sons, Ltd. v. West Norfolk Farmers' Manure & Chem. CoOperative Co., [1943] 2 All E.R. 94 (Ch.).
Woodhouse & Co. v. Woodhouse, 30 T.L.R. 559 (1914).
2 76 F. Supp. 643 (E.D.N.Y. 1948), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Prudence-Bonds Corp.
v. Prudence Realization, 174 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1949).
76 F. Supp. at 646.
1 Thus, the court concluded:
Where we have a corporate trustee, the rights involved are not alone the rights of a
bondholder but of all parties to the Trust Agreement. . . . Where we are dealing only
with opinions and legal advice of counsel, the court cannot and should not close its
eyes, solely because of the interest of bondholders, to the other important right of such
a corporate trustee, with its large responsibility, . . . without being influenced by fear
that in some subsequent litigation such opinions or advice so rendered, may be gener-
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A particularly acute problem arises in suits in which the corporate
client is the defendant in an action brought by one of its shareholders. 5 In
such cases, before granting discovery of communications alleged to be
privileged, the court must balance the shareholder's need in ascertaining
management's considerations utilized in pursuing a course of conduct
which may be inimical to their interests with, inter alia, the necessity that
the corporation be able to conduct its business free from vexatious interference by a dissident few.
Garner v. Wolfinbarger
The decision which resolved the conflict between these competing
interests was Garner v. Wolfinbarger,6 wherein the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit held that upon a showing of "good cause"87 by plaintiff
shareholders, communications of their corporation are discoverable, notwithstanding the fact that such communications were made within the
context of the privileged attorney-client relationship. In so holding, the
court developed a flexible rule, which, if properly applied within its narrow
boundaries, represents a major step forward in protecting the rights of
shareholders whose interests have been adversely affected."
In Garner, shareholders of the First American Life Insurance Co. of
Alabama (FAL) instituted a class action against the company alleging
violations of federal and state securities laws, as well as common law fraud.
During pretrial deposition, questions were asked of FAL's former attorney
relating to communications between the attorney and the directors of FAL
concerning the issuance and sale of certain stock. FAL objected to these
interrogatories, contending the communications were protected by the
attorney-client privilege. Upon motions to require the attorney to answer
the questions, the district court ruled that the privilege was unavailable
to FAL against the plaintiff shareholders. 89 The court held that English
ally gone over with a biased eye and bring him before a court to explain why he gave
same.
Id. at 646-47. Accord, Arney v. George A. Hormel & Co., 53 F.R.D. 179 (D. Minn. 1971)
(mem.) (communications from attorney to settlor of corporate pension plan privileged); In
re Scranton Corp., 37 F.R.D. 465 (M.D. Pa. 1965) (attorney's memorandum to cotrustees in
bankruptcy privileged as to bankrupt's creditors).
11 Cf. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 207 F. Supp. 771, 774-75 (N.D. Ill. 1962);
Simon, supra note 3, at 966-69.
430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971).
'7 430 F.2d at 1104.
See notes 96-103 and accompanying text infra.
" Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 280 F. Supp. 1018 (N.D. Ala. 1968), vacated and remanded, 430
F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971). For a criticism of the district
court's ruling, see Comment, The Attorney-Client Privilege in Shareholder'sSuits, 69 COLUM.
L. REV. 309 (1969).
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common law, incorporated into the law of Alabama,"0 did not extend the
attorney-client privilege to a corporation in suits against it by its shareholders."
The Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded, 2 declining to formulate any
black letter rubric regarding the availability of the privilege in shareholder
suits. Balancing the "interests between injury resulting from disclosure
3
and the benefit gained in the correct disposal of litigation,"' the court
4
framed the issue in the context of the "particularized contest" at hand
Accordingly, in the instant case, in which the client seeking to assert the
privilege was deemed by law to be acting in the interest of those against
whom the privilege is claimed," a reexamination of the factors that have
traditionally determined the availability of the privilege was thought to be
mandated. If, after an examination of these factors, the harm of disclosure
is outweighed by the benefits to be obtained by the shareholders, the
privilege should fail. The court labeled the factors that would defeat a
claim of privilege "good cause."
The Balancing Approach
The Garner court's conception of good cause arises out of the "particularized context" of the corporation-shareholder relationship. Thus, unlike
cases in which unrelated litigants are seeking discovery of privileged communications, different considerations necessarily apply where the parties
are linked by fiduciary duties. In such cases, the court must balance the
interests of the respective parties, at all times remaining cognizant of the
abuses which would result from either an unequivocal denial of the privilege on the one hand, or an absolute bar of the shareholders' right of
discovery on the other.
A right of unrestricted access to privileged communications by the
shareholder presents a grave threat to the effective functioning of the corporation. For example, there may be times where, at first blush, it appears
11In the course of its opinion, the district court noted that there had been no American
decision to date dealing with the question before it. Accordingly, the court applied the Alabama reception statute, ALA. CODE tit. 1, § 3 (1960), and utilized the English law of privilege
for the basis of its holding.
11280 F. Supp. at 1019; accord, Fischer v. Wolfinbarger, 45 F.R.D. 510 (W.D. Ky. 1968). For
a discussion of the English cases, see notes 79-81 and accompanying text supra.
12430 F.2d at 1104. On remand, the district court ruled that FAL could not assert the
privilege, declaring that "[nlo officer, controlling stockholder, attorney or creditor of the
corporation is entitled to conceal from the plaintiff stockholders whatever the facts [in issue]
may be." Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 56 F.R.D. 499, 504 (S.D. Ala. 1972).
'1

430 F.2d at 1101.

94 Id.

See notes 69-78 and accompanying text supra.
"

See note 68 supra.
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that management is acting adversely to the shareholders' interest, while
upon closer examination it is clear that they are not. 7 Furthermore, the
threat of unwarranted and vexatious suits" increases as curious shareholders are given the right to inspect privileged corporate communications. In
fact, one commentator submits that, in most cases, shareholders in a derivative or class action actually do not represent the interests of the majority
of shareholders; hence, disclosure of privileged communications would outweigh any benefits which might be derived by the corporation. 9
The existence of a blanket privilege for all communications by corporate management, however, is equally undesirable. 0 Shareholders, it must
be remembered, are the true owners of the corporation. Thus, logic dictates
they should be permitted to inspect the documents of their agents (management) who may have acted inimically to their interests. Furthermore,
the sheer size of many modern corporations sometimes militates against a
shareholder obtaining information relating to the workings of his company. 9 ' Refusing these shareholders the right to inspect documents because of their privileged character can give management an undue advantage against a shareholder prosecuting a viable claim.
The Garner court struck a new balance between these competing interests, hinging the availability of the attorney-client privilege upon "the
right of the stockholders to show cause why it should not be invoked in the
"TSuch a situation might occur where a target corporation purposely decreases its liquidity
by applying its assets to capital improvement or increases the corporate debt through investment in order to thwart an attempted takeover bid by tender offer. See 2 B. Fox & E. Fox,
CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS & MERGERS, § 27.07[1], at 27-114 (1975). Although these tactics
ultimately may prove profitable for the target company, an individual shareholder ignorant
of such defensive maneuvers might object. If the dissident shareholder, without showing that
the alleged corporate action constitutes legally cognizable harm, is permitted to destroy the
corporation's attorney-client privilege, the success of the target company's venture might be
jeopardized.
9'See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949).
" Brereton, Abrogation of the CorporatePrivilege in Stockholder Suits, 15 PIAC. LAW., July
1969, at 24, 27. The purpose of the derivative suit, however, seems to militate against the
author's contentions. In a derivative action, the wrong sought to be redressed is not a personal
wrong to the individual plaintiff. Rather, the plaintiff sues on behalf of the corporation for a
cause of action it has failed to assert. Additionally, all proceeds resulting from a successful
suit revert to the corporation. Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 99 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting). Thus, since in a derivative action the corporation is the actual injured party
plaintiff and since the privilege is designed to protect the corporate client, the corporation
would be, in effect, invoking the privilege of silence against itself.
See notes 69-78 supra.
101 See 49 N.C. L. REV. 802, 806 n.24 (1971), wherein it is stated that "[b]y utilizing complicated organizational structures, vast numbers of agents, and advantageous accounting procedures, management can be very successful in hiding from the lay investor exactly what it is
doing."
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particular instance."'' 2 Seeking to preclude an escalation of suits, the court
indicated that a showing of good cause depends largely upon the nature
and extent of the shareholder interest involved in the suit. Management's
flexibility and freedom from harassment is protected by requiring that the
shareholders show some likelihood of harm to their interests as a result of
past or prospective management actions. Moreover, the court's use of an
in camera inspection of the documents sought to be discovered will prevent
03
revelation of corporate trade secrets.1
The Elements of Good Cause
In setting forth one of the requirements of good cause, the Garnercourt
mentioned the "obviously colorable" character of the claim of the plaintiff
shareholder. 0° Additionally, the court alluded to the prospective crime or
fraud exception in order to underscore the less than absolute nature of the
privilege. 05
The court, while seeing no distinction between criminal acts, fraudulent transactions, or acts of questionable legality,'"' failed to enunciate the
quantum of proof necessary to destroy the privileged nature of the communications. 07 Despite the confusion in this area, a case decided subsequent
102

430 F.2d at 1103-04 (footnote omitted).

Id. at 1104. Additionally, the Garnercourt indicated that good cause is dependent on other
factors, such as: whether the document sought to be produced is identified as opposed to "the
extent to which the shareholders are blindly fishing;" whether the document is material to
the shareholders' claim; the necessity of the shareholders procuring the information; and,
"the bona fides of the shareholders." Id.
'

Id.
I0
Id. at 1102-03. See note 60 and accompanying text supra.
430 F.2d at 1104.
'o Inasmuch as the Garner court's discussion of the prospective crime or fraud exception was
in the context of an analogy, its standards regarding the quantum of proof necessary to vitiate
the privilege must be viewed as dicta. Perhaps most of the confusion in this area is due to
careless wording by courts discussing the quantum of proof necessary to defeat the attorneyclient privilege. Compare SEC v. Harrison, 80 F. Supp. 226, 230 (D.D.C. 1948) (party seeking
to overcome attorney-client privilege "must produce sufficient evidence" to show wrongful
purpose), with United States v. Shewfelt, 455 F.2d 836, 840 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
944 (1972) (government must "establish a prima facie case of fraud independently" of privileged communications). Perhaps the most perplexing in this line of cases is Pfizer, Inc. v.
Lord, 456 F.2d 545 (8th Cir. 1972) (per curiam), wherein the court apparently extended the
burden necessary for the moving party to defeat the privilege, declaring he must produce
sufficient evidence that the communications were in furtherance of an illegal purpose and
make a "prima facie showing" of the crime or fraud. Id. at 549-50 (emphasis in original).
Moreover, a plausible argument can be made that the Garnercourt was giving its imprimatur to the discovery of heretofore privileged communications where a colorable showing of
illegal purpose is made, in accord with an earlier decision within the Fifth Circuit, Pollock v.
United States, 202 F.2d 281 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 993 (1953). Accord, United
States v. Billingsley, 440 F.2d 823 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 909 (1971). Contra, United
States v. Aldridge, 484 F.2d 655 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 921 (1974).
'

'
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to Garnermandates that a mere charge of wrongdoing will not be sufficient
to overcome the privilege. In IT&T v. United Telephone Co.,'0 8 a district
court located within the Fifth Circuit held that the party seeking discovery
of otherwise privileged documents must make a prima facie showing that
the challenged communications were made in furtherance of a crime or
fraud.109
It is submitted that requiring a prima facie case of fraud to be proven
before the privilege is destroyed is error."10 If the plaintiff shareholder has
the burden of actually proving fraud it may be almost impossible to do so
without the aid of the privileged communications he seeks. Moreover, once
a prima facie case of fraud is proven, the shareholder will already have
proven the major part of his cause of action without the necessity of defeating the privilege.
If, however, the privilege may be vitiated upon a showing of illegal
purpose, the interests of both management and the plaintiff shareholder
will be served. Management will be protected from shareholders who are
merely curious, but unable to provide any real justification for their desire
for information."' Those shareholders whose rights have actually been violated, on the other hand, will be free from the abuses resulting from an
overprotective, or possibly guilty management invoking the attorney-client
privilege.
EXTENSIONS OF

Garner: THE

CORPORATE CLIENT IN A DUAL FIDUCIARY
CAPACITY

In light of the reexamination of the traditional balance of interests
advanced by Garner, it is evident that a similar reevaluation is warranted
in cases in which either the attorney or the corporate client discovers itself
in a position in which it owes fiduciary responsibilities to more than one
'

60 F.R.D. 177 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
Id. at 184.

See Gardner, A Re-Evaluation of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 8 ViL. L. REV. 279 (1963),
wherein it is suggested:
The crime or tort exception plays a valuable role in the law of attorney-client privilege.
In addition to keeping the law aligned on the side of morality, in the theoretical sense,
it frees the hand of counsel to aid the law in bringing to justice an unscrupulous person
who would use the law for nefarious ends.
Id. at 328.
"I Initially, lowering the evidentiary burden placed upon shareholders who seek to utilize the
prospective crime or fraud exception might result in an increase in the number of shareholder
suits. Exercise of in camera inspection of documents sought to be discovered, as well as
careful examination of the pleadings and bona fides by the courts, however, should be sufficient to safeguard against abuses in this regard. Moreover, in response to the threat of such
litigation, a corporation might also release more information to prospective plaintiff shareholders in order to discourage them from resort to the courts.
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entity. Here, opportunities for speculative abuse are great since "[a] fiduciary cannot turn his responsibilities on and off like a faucet."" 2 Thus, in
situations in which one has a continuing fiduciary relationship with two
different parties with adverse interests, any justification for use of the
attorney-client privilege to withhold information concerning the affairs of
one of these principals is highly speculative. At the same time, however,
courts must take great pains to guard against opening the door to the
divulgence of heretofore privileged communications to those who seek
these communications merely out of curiosity or to those blindly hoping
to somehow bolster an obviously frivolous claim.
In Garner,the court pointed to the joint attorney exception"' to underscore the necessity that corporations not be permitted to shield relevant
communications from their shareholders."' Garner drew its support for
application of the joint attorney exception in shareholder suits from Pattie
Lea, Inc. v. District Court."5 There, the Supreme Court of Colorado, sitting
en banc, unanimously held that the statutory accountant-client privilege"'
did not "protect a corporation from being required to disclose to its own
stockholders in a derivative suit brought in good faith against the corporation, communications made by the corporation to its certified public
accountant.""' 7 Because the communications were made to an accountant
rather than an attorney"' and because the court failed to indicate whether
Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 211, 214 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (mem.).
See notes 61-66 and accompanying text supra.
"'
430 F.2d at 1103. In this context Garner additionally drew, in part, from partnership cases.
See Billias v. Panageotou, 193 Wash. 523, 76 P.2d,987 (1938) (partner cannot shield communications from other partner to partnership attorney). Again, the analogy is less than perfect.
Shareholders and the corporation are linked by the joint interest of the maximization of
profits. The relationship between them is not as intimate as that between partners. A partnership is entirely consensual in nature, with each partner having agency status as to the other
and being subject to personal liability for partnership debts. A corporation, on the other hand,
is treated as a separate legal entity, distinct from its shareholders. This result in, inter alia,
liability for the shareholder being limited to the amount of his investment. See generally F.
MECHEM, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP §§ 7-8 (2d ed. 1920).
,- 161 Colo. 493, 423 P.2d 27 (1967) (en banc).
§ 13-90-107(f) (1973).
"..COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
"7 161 Colo. at 497, 423 P.2d at 30.
"'
Unlike the privilege between attorney and client, common law did not recognize an
accountant-client privilege. Further, by 1968, only 15 states and Puerto Rico had conferred
privileged status to communications between accountant and client. 46 N.C. L. REV. 419, 420
n.7 (1968). Moreover, federal courts have failed to extend any privilege to such communications. See, e.g., Sale v. United States, 228 F.2d 682 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1006
(1956) (no privilege for accountant's work product); Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d
924 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949) (privilege between accountant and client not
recognized). See generally Comment, The Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other
Professionals: Its Implications for the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J.
1226, 1247-49 (1962).
"'
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the documents sought were privileged or consisted of the accountant's work
product, any analogy between Pattie Lea and the typical derivative suit
involving the attorney-client privilege would appear to be less than compelling. '
The analogy, though not perfect, does seem to have some relevancy
in the shareholder-corporation (parent) context. For example, an attorney
advising management is informing a fiduciary of the rights of his
"beneficiaries." Thus, the fiduciary relationship of management to the
shareholders is infused to management's agent-the attorney. The attorney, therefore, becomes the agent of both management and the shareholders, thereby furnishing the joint attorney exception with viability in this
area. In light of the dual fiduciary capacity of the attorney, to permit these
communications to retain their privileged character would be to allow the
attorney to ignore his responsibilities towards one whom he is duty bound
to protect.
Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc.
Further amplification of the Garner holding was enunciated in Bailey
v. Meister Brau, Inc.,110 wherein the court disallowed the attorney-client
privilege on the theory that a director of a corporation, serving in a dual
fiduciary capacity, may not shield his communications from one of the
"I Interestingly, 1 year prior to Pattie Lea, the Colorado Supreme Court had declined to
vitiate the same accountant-client privilege in a class action brought by shareholders of a
transferor corporation resulting from a stock-for-stock merger. In Weck v. District Court, 158
Colo. 521, 408 P.2d 987 (1966) (en banc), the court held that the privilege could be asserted
by the survivor corporation for four reasons: First, the survivor was not made a party to the
action; second, the only persons within the class were former shareholders of the transferor-consequently, shareholders of the survivor would derive no benefit from the litigation;
third, plaintiffs were afforded full access to the survivor's books and records and could conduct their own audit if they wished; and, fourth, the privilege was not waived by distribution
of financial statements and annual reports by the survivor.
Commenting upon this abrupt about face, the Pattie Lea court merely indicated that
the facts in Weck "differ substantially from those in the case at bar." 161 Colo. at 499, 423
P.2d at 30. Perhaps the Weck court was reluctant to vitiate the privilege due to the form in
which the action was brought. In a class action, the corporate client derives no benefit from
the litigation. In fact, any damages awarded the plaintiff shareholders deplete corporate
funds. In a derivative action, however, any damages realized go to the corporation, the
nominal plaintiff. See 13 FLETCHER, supra note 69, § 5908. Thus, in PattieLea, the corporation
was attempting to invoke the privilege to its own detriment, whereas in Weck, the privilege
was recognized as a necessary concomitant to aid the corporate client in choosing a course of
action. If this interpretation is correct, its reasoning appears to be strained in that regardless
of the form of the shareholder action, directors should not be able to subordinate the interests
of shareholders and then cloak their actions behind the privilege. See Weck v. District Court,
158 Colo. 521, 525, 408 P.2d 987, 994-95 (1966) (en banc) (dissenting opinion). But cf. Graham
v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 49 Del. Ch. 78, 188 A.2d 125 (1963).
Im 55 F.R.D. 211 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (mem.).
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fiduciaries upon a showing of good cause by the fiduciary. In Bailey, the
plaintiff, a former officer, director, and shareholder of James H. Black Co.,
sued Meister Brau and others, alleging that they had conspired to breach
his contract to purchase the company. Prior to the institution of the action,
Cappadocia, a senior vice president of Meister Brau had been named president and chairman of the board of Black pursuant to Meister Brau's plans
to acquire the assets of Black. While serving as an officer of both corporations, Cappadocia consulted Meister Brau's counsel concerning the acquisition of Black. During the deposition stage of the proceedings, Cappadocia refused to answer questions pertaining to the substance of these
discussions, whereupon plaintiff moved to compel him to answer notwithstanding the claim of attorney-client privilege.
In framing the issue, the court recognized that Cappadocia had a dual
fiduciary obligation. As vice president of Meister Brau, he was responsible
to that corporation and its shareholders.12"' Similarly, as president and
chairman of the board of Black, he owed a concurrent fiduciary obligation
to that corporation and its shareholders.'2 2 The Bailey court recognized
Garner,although factually different, as providing the proper framework for
confronting attorney-client privilege questions, noting that it "sets up an
approach to problems involving the privilege that seems applicable
here."'2
In ruling that the privilege did not attach to Cappadocia's communications, the court was careful to note that, in and of itself, the dual fiduciary capacity of Cappadocia would not be enough to destroy the privilege.2 4 Good cause, as defined by Garner, is, the Bailey court ruled, a
necessary concomitant to the nonavailability of the privilege in situations
in which a corporate officer serves in a dual fiduciary capacity.125 The court
was able to dispose of the good cause requirement easily, noting that
"[p]laintifis claim contains substantial allegations of wrongful action by
Cappadocia and others ... ,""' thus pigeonholing2 7good cause, in this case,
within the prospective crime or fraud exception.
121 See

notes 69-78 and accompanying text supra.
Id.
" 55 F.R.D. at 213. Noting that in Garner management was linked by fiduciary duties to
the FAL shareholders, the Bailey court declared that the interest in ascertaining management
considerations "is even stronger where an executive's communications have been with counsel
for a party whose interests are potentially adverse to those of the executive's shareholders,
as here." Id. at 214.
" But see Valente v. PepsiCo, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 361 (D. Del. 1975) (mem.), discussed in notes
129-31 and accompanying text infra.
12155 F.R.D. at 214.
126 Id.
'r See id. Additionally, the Bailey court utilized a lesser burden of proof to vitiate the
privilege than that currently utilized within the Fifth Circuit. See notes 106-11 supra.
122
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Bailey thus extends the reasoning of Garner to suits in which the
person invoking the attorney-client privilege on behalf of the corporation
owes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of two different corporations. The
court's reasoning appears to be sound, inasmuch as the shareholders of
Black should have the right to know the factors which Meister Brau considered in deciding the fate of their company. By permitting discovery of these
communications, the court, in effect, ensured that Meister Brau could not
legally subordinate the rights of the Black shareholders in order to further
Meister Brau's interests. In addition, by hinging the availability of the
privilege upon a showing of good cause by the party who seeks to discover
these heretofore privileged communications, the court allowed reasonable
discovery, consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,' 28 while at
the same time preserving the privilege in the proper circumstances.
THE PRIVILEGE IN PARENT-SUBSIDIARY RELATIONS:

Valente v. PepsiCo, Inc.

Recently, in Valente v. PepsiCo, Inc. ,l" a decision of potential importance, a district court refused to allow a parent corporation to invoke the
attorney-client privilege against minority shareholders of its subsidiary.
The court based its reasoning not upon Garner, but rather upon wellestablished fiduciary principles, eliminating from its consideration any
inquiry as to good cause. In so doing, the court may have opened the door
to a flood of vexatious and irresponsible lawsuits by shareholders of a
subsidiary seeking privileged information from the parent to substantiate
spurious claims. 3 '
In 1970, PepsiCo, Inc., desiring to acquire full control of Wilson Sporting Goods Co. (Wilson), acquired 74 percent of the outstanding Wilson
shares in a single purchase, later acquiring an additional 6 percent through
purchases on the open market. Pursuant to its plan, PepsiCo offered the
minority shareholders of Wilson $17.50 for each of their shares. Additionally, holders of Wilson warrants, exercisable until 1979 at $20.50 per share,
were offered $3.50 for each warrant. Alleging that PepsiCo had made material misrepresentations to holders of Wilson securities, and also that the
purchase price offered to Wilson shareholders and warrant holders was
unfair, plaintiffs instituted a class action claiming violations of the federal
securities laws, as well as pendent claims of fraud. 3' Upon refusal by
28

See note 6 and accompanying text supra.

68 F.R.D. 361 (D. Del. 1975) (mem.).
See notes 156-60 and accompanying text infra.
'3' Plaintiffs alleged that prior to an unfavorable Internal Revenue Service ruling concerning
the proposed merger of Wilson into PepsiCo, PepsiCo had manifested to the Wilson warrant
holders that they would be treated as Wilson shareholders upon the merger. After PepsiCo
had refused to permit inspection of the documents prepared by its counsel concerning the
rights of the Wilson minority, claiming they were protected by the attorney-client privilege,
'

'
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PepsiCo to produce certain documents on the ground that they were privileged, plaintiffs moved to compel disclosure, asserting that the privilege
was unavailable to a parent against the minority shareholders of its subsidiary.
Parent's Duty to Its Subsidiary
In order to examine the bases upon which the Valente court rested its
decision it is first necessary to examine some of the considerations with
which it dealt.
Although the scope of the corporate fiduciary doctrine has been
cloudy, its thrust remained constant, i.e., regardless of who controls a
corporation or its subsidiary, a fiduciary duty is owed to any entity under
its domination. 3 ' Correlative to this duty is the doctrine that the majority
shareholders of a corporation owe a fiduciary duty to both the corporation
and to its other shareholders when these controlling shareholders assume
the powers of directors of the corporation.' 33 In such circumstances
[t]he directors of a corporation represent it and its stockholders; the majority stockholders of a corporation represent it and its minority stockholders.
The vote of every director and of every majority stockholder must be directed
to and controlled by the guiding question of what is best for the corporation,
for which he is, to all legal intents and purposes, trustee.'
Similarly, the corporate fiduciary doctrine requires the imposition of
these fiduciary duties in parent-subsidiary relations. 3 5 Once again, the
directors of the parent must deal with the subsidiary in fairness and the
3
utmost good faith."
The same considerations which apply to directors of
plaintiffs moved, pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 37, to compel production of the documents
claimed to be shielded by the privilege. See Plaintiff's Brief Supporting Motion to Compel
Production of Documents and Answers to Interrogatories at 1-3, Valente v. PepsiCo, Inc., 68
F.R.D. 361 (D. Del. 1975) (mem.).
132 See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483 (1919). Corporations and their shareholders are linked by fiduciary duties arising from the actuality of control, not the form. Thus,
in Southern Pacific, the Court imposed duties of fairness and good faith on the parent because
its subsidiary was the controlling shareholder in plaintiff shareholder's corporation, noting
that imposition of fiduciary duties "does not rest upon . . . technical distinctions." Id. at
492.
'3 See note 72 and accompanying text supra.
'
Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., 125 F.2d 369, 372 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 675
(1942).
"I A parent-subsidiary relationship arises when one corporation acquires a controlling interest in another, regardless of whether the acquiring corporation eventually acquires full ownership. Brudney & Chirelstein, FairShares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 297 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Brudney & Chirelstein].
See, e.g., Grace v. Grace Nat'l Bank, 465 F.2d 1068 (2d Cir. 1972); Western Pac. R.R. v.
Metzger, 197 F.2d 994 (9th Cir. 1951).
13
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the dominating parent also apply to the majority shareholders of the parent which dominates its subsidiary. 37 One commentator, in fact, submits
that "[tihe power to control . . . should be considered in no lesser light
than that of the power of a trustee to deal with the trust estate and with
the beneficiary."' 3
Rights of Minority Shareholders of the Subsidiary
In construing the dealings of the parent with its subsidiary, courts, on
the whole, have subjected these transactions to what is termed the fairness
doctrine.'39 Basically, fairness requires "that upon a merger the minority
stockholder shall receive the substantial equivalent in value of what he had
before." 10 Due to the complexity of corporate finance and accounting procedures, however, any determination of what is a fair return for these
minority shareholders is usually extremely difficult."' Accordingly, courts
have tended to look upon these exchanges as arm's length transactions,
with each party bargaining in good faith as equals, and have been reluctant
to disturb them absent a clear showing of fraud or bad faith." 2
The realities of the situation, however, dictate a different conclusion.
Rather than constituting an arm's length transaction between equals,
these valuations often are the product of a single group in control of both
'" See, e.g., Maggiore v. Bradford, 310 F.2d 519 (6th Cir. 1962); Speed v. Transamerica Corp.,
99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951), aff'd, 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956). Contra, Geller v. Transamerica Corp., 53 F. Supp. 625 (D. Del. 1943) (majority shareholders owe no fiduciary duty to
minority).
I N. LATTIN, CORPORATIONS, ch. 12 § 8, at 565 (1959).
'31See generally Note, The Fiduciary Duty of Parent to Subsidiary Corporation, 57 VA. L.
REV. 1223 (1971); Note, Corporate Fiduciary Doctrine in the Context of Parent-Subsidiary
Relations, 74 YALE L.J. 338 (1964).
"
Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 306, 93 A.2d 107, 114 (1952).
'' There is considerable disagreement over the question whether the parent must share any
tax benefits resulting from the merger with the shareholders of the subsidiary. See Brudney
& Chirelstein, supra note 135, at 309-13 (submitting that tax gains should be shared by the
subsidiary but recognizing existing law is to the contrary). Moreover, the allocation of good
will upon the sale of the disappearing corporation is oftentimes a difficult task. Cf. Perlman
v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955). There, the lower court
found that $20 per share was a fair price for the control block of corporate stock, reasoning
that the market price had not exceeded $12 per share. It found that the increased price was
due to the transfer of corporate power, ignoring the fact that a shortage of the steel products
manufactured by the corporation existed at the time of the sale. The Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the dominant shareholders, who negotiated the
price, were responsible to the minority as fiduciaries. The price of the sale, the court declared,
was not limited to the tangible balance sheet assets of the corporation. Where the dominant
shareholders undervalued the rights of the minority by not including the good will arising
from the steel shortage and favorable market conditions in the purchase price, they did not
meet the high standard of loyalty owed by a fiduciary to his principal.
"I See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-07 (1939).
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the parent and the subsidiary.'43 Characterizing dealings between a parent
and its subsidiary as an arm's length transaction ignores the degree of
control possessed over the subsidiary by the parent."' Some degree of this
inherent unfairness can be ameliorated through the exercise of appraisal
rights'45 by the minority with the concomitant requirements of full disclosure 14 even where the vote of the minority shareholder is arithmetically
useless.' 7 Yet, even with full disclosure of the facts underlying the valuation of the minority shareholder's interest, the natural tendency of the
parent to value the assets of the subsidiary as low as possible seems to
militate against the minority shareholder receiving the same value for his
"I In circumstances in which the negotiation of merger agreements is the product of two
boards of directors with common members, the contracting boards may not be dealing with
each other at arm's length. Negotiations, supposedly engineered by adverse parties, may in
fact be between the same persons, resulting in a transfer which is invariably in favor of the
dominant party. While the existence of interlocking directorates in negotiations does not in
and of itself constitute fraud, a stricter standard of scrutiny should be employed in reviewing
the fairness of such transactions. See 15 FLETCHER, supra note 69, § 7160, at 255-57. See, e.g.,
Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590 (1921), wherein the Court condemned
the actions of interlocking directors in selling all the assets of an unprofitable subsidiary to
the parent, finding the price paid to the subsidiary's shareholders inadequate. The Court
noted that the dissolution of the subsidiary was justified due to the exigencies of the market,
but felt that sale of the assets at a public sale would be a more realistic valuation of the
minority's interest. In so holding, the Court declared that in such a situation, "where the
fairness of such transactions is challenged the burden is upon those who would maintain them
" Id. at 599 (citations omitted).
to show their entire fairness ....
. As the degree of control exercised by the parent increases, the options left open to the
minority shareholders of the subsidiary proportionately decrease. Professor Eisenberg has
noted that as the parent's interest in the subsidiary approaches complete control, the market
for the subsidiary's stock virtually disappears, a situation that is aggravated if the parent,
for its own business purposes, reduces or eliminates dividends. Eisenberg, The Legal Role of
Shareholders and Management in Modern Corporate Decisionmaking,57 CALIF. L. REV. 1,
132-33 (1969).
"' But see Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 135, at 304-07.
'" In addition to being necessary for the exercise of appraisal rights, full disclosure of the
terms and consequences of the merger to the subsidiary's shareholders serves at least two
other purposes. First, disclosure will inform the public so as to permit well-reasoned decisions
about buying, selling, or holding the securities of the corporations involved in the merger. See
generally SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969). Second, disclosure of merger terms could trigger either modification or
at least reconsideration of the offer. Hence, if the merger terms were unfair, the parent might
change them rather than subject itself to either a suit by the minority or a possible SEC
enforcement action. See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 435 F.2d 1121, 1124 (2d
Cir. 1970). See also Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 135, at 301-04. Moreover, nondisclosure
by the parent subjects it to suit regardless of whether the merger price was fair. See Mills v.
Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 378, 381, 386 (1970) (disclosure requirements intertwined with fairness considerations); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66, 99100 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973) (notwithstanding fairness of exchange
rate, parent's material omission gives rise to liability).
' Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 135, at 301.
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interest as he might receive upon dissolution.' Thus, it is imperative that
in ascertaining the rights of minority shareholders when it is claimed that
the parent has not afforded the minority full disclosure or has provided
them with an unfair valuation of their interests, the court views with
skepticism any withholding of relevant information concerning the exchange rate by the parent on the ground that it is shielded by the attorneyclient privilege.
The FiduciaryDuty Exception
In light of the aforementioned considerations, the Valente court held
that the right of the Wilson minority shareholders to full and fair disclosure
of the considerations PepsiCo took into account in the valuation of their
interests outweighed the protective cloak of the attorney-client privilege.
Noting that the situation involved in the instant case was "more complex
than a mere waiver problem,"'' 9 the court undertook "an examination of
the function of the [privilege], and of the role of attorneys and other
fiduciaries in light of the requirements of the law."' 50 Recognizing that the
privilege retains vitality in the corporate arena, the court was nevertheless
aware of the reasoning of Garnerand Bailey, though it felt they were "not
controlling since we deal here with the application where a minority shareholder seeks information not from his own corporation, but from a separate
corporation which was a controlling shareholder in his."' 5'
"I See generally Note, The Fiduciary Duty of Parent to Subsidiary Corporation,57 VA. L.
REV. 1223, 1226-27 (1971).
"1 68 F.R.D. at 366 (footnote omitted). Plaintiffs claimed that by answering a question during
deposition concerning the rights of the Wilson warrant holders, PepsiCo had waived the
protection afforded by the confidential attorney-client relationship. Plaintiff's Brief Supporting Motion to Compel the Production of Documents and Answers to Interrogatories at 10-13.
The court disagreed, holding "there was no knowing waiver of the privilege, but merely an
identification of the witness' own ideas." 68 F.R.D. at 366 n.9.
The court's decision appears to be correct, in that whenever a claim of privilege is
asserted, the alleged holder of the privilege is required to identify the communication. See,
e.g., International Paper Co. v. Fibreboard Corp., 63 F.R.D. 88, 93 (D. Del. 1974). In order
to waive the attorney-client privilege, the privilege holder must make his intention clear,
whether by acts or implication. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2327, at 634-39; Bierman v.
Marcus, 122 F. Supp. 250 (D.N.J. 1954) (client's testimony on privileged communication
waives all other communications on same matter); In re Associated Gas & Elec. Co., 59 F.
Supp. 743 (S.D.N.Y. 1944) (voluntary testimony regarding privileged matter at earlier hearing waives privilege at subsequent litigation).
68 F.R.D. at 366 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 367 (footnote omitted). It is submitted, however, that Bailey was sufficiently analogous to Valente to warrant closer examination by the court. In both cases, the asserted holder
of the privilege was in a conflicting fiduciary capacity: Cappadocia, to the shareholders of
Black and Meister Brau, see notes 120-22 and accompanying text supra; PepsiCo, to its own
shareholders and the minority shareholders of its subsidiary, Wilson. Moreover, in both cases,
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The court divided the documents sought by the Wilson minority into
two classes: First, two documents drafted by counsel for PepsiCo while
they were sitting on the Wilson board of directors; and, second, several
documents drafted by PepsiCo attorneys concerning the rights of the Wilson minority shareholders.' 2 Ruling the first class of documents were not
privileged since they fell under the joint attorney exception,' 53 the court
was able to dispose of this question rather easily. While the PepsiCo attorneys were not sitting on the Wilson board in their capacity as attorneys, it
is nevertheless clear that as members of the Wilson board, they owed to
the Wilson minority a fiduciary duty similar to that duty owed to PepsiCo
in their capacity as attorneys. Allowing these attorneys to shield relevant
information concerning the rights of the Wilson minority on the ground
that these communications were privileged matters between PepsiCo attorneys (Wilson board members) and PepsiCo, would be tantamount to
permitting PepsiCo to subordinate the rights of the Wilson minority.
It is in its discussion of the second class of documents, those drafted
by PepsiCo attorneys concerning the rights of the Wilson minority, that
the Valente court's reasoning becomes tenuous. Valente posits that PepsiCo, in its capacity as controlling shareholder of Wilson, owed a fiduciary
duty to the Wilson minority, and that this same duty was infused through
PepsiCo to the PepsiCo attorneys. Thus, the court stated:
The attorneys whose opinions were written to PepsiCo could not avoid PepsiCo's own obligations as a fiduciary. Where the fiduciary 'has co'nfiicting
interests of its own, to allow the attorney-client privilege to block access to
the party seeking to overcome the privilege was a minority shareholder of a corporation
dominated by a more powerful parent.
"I To facilitate discussion, the six documents sought to be discovered by the Wilson minority
will be listed.
Class 1
Document 1: Memorandum from PepsiCo general counsel, sitting on the Wilson
board of directors, concerning acquisition of Wilson minority interests.
Document 2: Legal opinion from PepsiCo outside counsel, serving on the Wilson
board, concerning the merger and rights of the parties.
Class 2
Document 3: Memorandum from PepsiCo house counsel to PepsiCo executive concerning alternative in event of unfavorable revenue ruling.
Document 4: Memorandum from outside counsel for PepsiCo discussing acquisition
of Wilson shares.
Document 5: Memorandum from house counsel to PepsiCo executive discussing an
alternative course of action in the event of an unfavorable tax ruling.
Document 6: Legal opinion sent by Delaware outside counsel to New York outside
counsel concerning rights of Wilson minority under Delaware law.
68 F.R.D. at 366 n.8.
"' See notes 61-66 & 113-19 and accompanying text supra.
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the information and bases of its decisions as to the person to whom the
obligation is owed would allow the perpetration of frauds. 5 '
While the court's reasoning in this phase of its inquiry appears to be
sound, it is submitted the inquiry was incomplete. Properly limited, the
dual fiduciary capacity of the PepsiCo attorneys should outweigh the
attorney-client privilege only upon a showing of good cause by the Wilson
minority. Moreover, it appears that by limiting its inquiry to the fiduciary
capacity of the PepsiCo attorneys, the Valente court was departing from
the well-reasoned, practical principles advanced by Garner. It should be
noted that the Valente court did seem to pay lip service to the elements of
good cause, noting that there are "limits" 5 ' on its holding. Nevertheless,
by excluding good cause from its inquiry, the court may have unwittingly
opened the door to abuses not present in the instant case.
For example, the Valente holding is in direct conflict with the reasoning of an earlier decision, In re Prudence-Bonds Corp.' 56 There, the court
refused to circumvent the privilege for the benefit of bondholders seeking
access to privileged communications made to the bond trustee on the
theory that the trustee should be able to administer his trust free from
vexatious interference.1 57 Furthermore, by refusing to even consider the
extent of shareholder interest represented in the Valente action, the court
may have indirectly fostered a proliferation of suits by a small minority
who wrongly feel the majority has acted adversely to their interests or who
bring an action in bad faith, hoping for an advantageous settlement by a
15 8
defendant corporation not inclined to litigate the issue.
Moreover, it is conceivable that, in a battle for corporate control, a
defeated tender offeror (A) may sue the acquiring corporation (B), claiming violation of the SEC proxy rules19 or the Williams Act,"' ° and seek
68 F.R.D. at 369 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 370. Thus, the court stated:
Were the claim here one made in bad faith, or one where the interests of the great
majority of the beneficiaries would be better served by the privilege, the case would
be different indeed. Similarly, if the information sought were a trade secret, or otherwise covered by other public policies which would give added weight to a need for
secrecy, the obligations of the fiduciary might have entirely different circumstances.
Id.
"4 76 F. Supp. 643 (E.D.N.Y. 1948), aff'd on other grounds, 174 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1949).
'5 See notes 82-84 and accompanying text supra.
"
See notes 97 & 98 and accompanying text supra. In addition, by its refusal to examine
the extent of Wilson shareholder interests involved in the litigation, the Valente court may
have allowed discovery of confidential PepsiCo considerations by one who owns a substantial
block of stock in a PepsiCo competitor. See Brereton, Abrogation of the Corporate Privilege
in Shareholder Suits, 15 PRAc. LAW., July, 1969, at 24, 27.
"4 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 et seq. (1975).
"4 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1970).
"4
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privileged information concerning B's takeover bid. If A retains a minority
interest in the target corporation, Valente would seem to mandate that the
considerations which B used in its decision to acquire the target corporation, as well as certain information about B itself, would be made available
to A, notwithstanding their privileged nature. Such a result offers widespread opportunities for abuse, especially if A and B are competitors. To
permit A to discover the market factors B considered significant might
effectively destroy any competitive advantage which B enjoys.
It is submitted, therefore, that the elements of good cause, as defined
by Garner,should have been incorporated into the Valente court's inquiry.
Thus, had the Wilson minority made a colorable showing of violations of
the securities laws, PepsiCo's privilege claim would have been defeated."6 t
By neglecting to pursue the final phase of what ideally should be a twostep inquiry, the Valente court has declined to follow existing case law,
bypassing the built-in safeguards afforded by the good cause requirement
and thereby permitting the Wilson minority to intrude upon PepsiCo's
privileged relationship with its attorneys.
CONCLUSION

It is now apparent that despite its seeming simplicity, the attorneyclient privilege in the federal courts today is a mass of conflicting precedents and policies. While the privilege remains a widely accepted rule of
evidence, it has occasionally been the subject of violent criticism as an
obstacle in search of the truth.6 2 Yet, its vitality remains intact, 63 albeit
See, e.g., Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 211, 214 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (mem.).
e.g., J. BENTHAM, Rationaleof Judicial Evidence, in 7 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM
743 (J. Bowring ed. 1962). Bentham attacked the privilege on the grounds that only the client
who has something to conceal benefits from the attorney-client privilege, and he is not worthy
of protection. The litigant whose hands are clean, on the other hand, has no need of the
protection afforded by the privilege since he has nothing to hide. Wigmore counters Bentham's argument by pointing out that there is "no hard and fast line between guilt and
innocence;" thus, the innocent client who discloses a fact fatal to his defense is not ipso facto
unworthy of protection. 8 WIMORE, supra note 1, § 2291, at 552 (emphasis in original).
Moreover, Wigmore submits that the privilege actually has the tendency to discourage litigation. When the attorney becomes aware of all the facts within the knowledge of his client, he
is able to weed out spurious claims and advise against their prosecution. Id., at 550-54.
Some commentators have suggested that the privilege serves no useful purpose and that
the actual reason for its preservation is sentimentality on the part of the bar to inhibit any
forced breach of attorney-client confidences. See, e.g., Radin, The Privilege of Confidential
Communications Between Lawyer and Client, 16 CALIF. L. REV. 487, 492-93 (1928).
"' One study, however, indicates that freedom of consultation between attorney and client
would not really be adversely affected by abolition of the privilege. The Yale Law Journal
discovered that out of 108 laymen polled, 55 believed lawyers could not be required to reveal
their confidential communications, whereas the remaining 53 did not know or felt an attorney
could be compelled to betray their confidences. Moreover, when questioned whether they
Io2 See,
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fragmented. Thus, district courts are often forced to analyze the thrust of
the privilege without resort to Supreme Court guidelines 4 or statutory
restraints, leaving each district court to develop its own concept of the role
of the corporate client or the role of the privilege in shareholder suits. If
the privilege is to exist at all, certainty should be its goal, so that an
attorney will know, in advance, whether a document will be discoverable
by an adversary. It is submitted, then, that Congress reconsider defining
and delineating the scope of the privilege to arrest this trend towards
balkanization.
would be less likely to give all relevant information to counsel absent the privilege, 55 indicated they would be less likely, 37 did not feel they would be less likely, and 16 did not know.
Comment, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals:Its Implications
for the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226, 1261-62 app. (1962).
"I The last time the Supreme Court agreed to review a question regarding the scope of the
attorney-client privilege was in 1971. Its final decision, however, had no precedential implications, leaving the definition of the corporate client an open question. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 400 U.S. 348 (1971), aff'g per curiam by an equally divided Court 423 F.2d
487 (7th Cir. 1970) (per curiam).

